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                    . . .let more than mere opinion reach you 
                    through me. —Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy But today, the average man, because of 
                    historical ignorance finds himself almost like a primitive, 
                    almost like the original man, and hence — other things aside 
                    — the unexpected forms of barbarism and savagery which burst 
                    suddenly from his old and hypercivilized soul. —Jose Ortega y Gasset When I read that, during the Great Leap 
                    Forward, in China, between twenty and forty million had 
                    died, I thought this must be the apotheosis of statistical 
                    whimsicality, until a short time later the news that 
                    “between twenty and eighty million had died during the 
                    Cultural Revolution.”……
 We ourselves are the prisoners of these 
                    numbers, these figures, the statistics — the millions; and 
                    millions upon millions. Is it possible that our careless, 
                    our casual, use of these “millions” is one of the reasons 
                    for the brutality, for cruelty? —Doris Lessing   
             Several years ago a college professor complained to a group of 
            graduate students that a freshman student claimed never to have 
            heard of Moses. How could someone pass through twelve years of 
            schooling untouched by this essential religious-historical fact? The 
            professor envisioned lazy and incompetent teachers failing to 
            satisfy the most minimal educational requirements; he probably 
            harbored a worse opinion of the student’s parents. This situation is but a sample circulating through the faculties 
            of high schools and colleges. Personally, I have tutored college 
            students so deficient in geography they have located China somewhere 
            near the Pyrenees — a mistake worthy of Gogol’s madman — and have 
            taught students who mistook England for Japan on a world map. Added 
            to this pathetic situation, student indifference to History rivals a 
            past indifference to Latin and Greek, an indifference which really 
            killed the dead languages. “I knew things were bad,” my professor remarked, “but are they 
            really this bad?” Things may not be as bad as he feared. The poor achievements of 
            American students documented in E.D. Hirsch’s
            CULTURAL LITERACY may exasperate the teacher, 
            and drive the History teacher in particular to despair, but the 
            official assessments of cultural and other illiteracies may be the 
            benign side of the problem. Things may be worse in a way not yet 
            considered. For instance, our “Moses” student could have had the Old 
            Testament read to him when he was a child; indeed, on television one 
            evening he may have seen Charlton Heston (whom the student only 
            knows as President of the National Rifle Association) part the Red 
            Sea. The special effects, however, may be better remembered than the 
            man who was being dramatized. And the student may have heard of the 
            Exodus from Egypt between Ren and Stimpy cartoons and 
            Gilligan’s Island reruns. Moses, again, may have come to his 
            brief attention but amidst Play Station, skateboarding, and The Back 
            Street Boys. Thus, upon reaching the college classroom, taking a 
            course he would have normally avoided but which was required, my 
            professor mentioned Moses in passing. Upon which, the student raised 
            his hand and asked who this man was. When you consider the quantity of information filling the average 
            student’s mental reservoir in the first eighteen years, what he or 
            she remembers tends toward the arbitrary and the increasingly 
            unexceptional. One might question whether this student’s knowing 
            who Moses was would make the state of education any better. That is, 
            would the ostensibly well-prepared college-bound student have a 
            better level of historical education than the apparently 
            ill-prepared student?  The History teacher’s task in the “Information Age” has been made 
            distressing when television and the Internet are the most active 
            sources of our myths, folklore, and stories, without foundation in 
            texts. How does the teacher distinguish for the student the 
            historical past — events fossilized in a textbook: but also the 
            events forming the nucleus of the student’s personality — from the 
            news media, music, video games, comic strips, talk shows, magazines, 
            and sports? In the News realm alone, current events are interpreted 
            as fast as they are reported, in effect out-running History with a 
            brand of hyper-historicism. How can the History teacher confidently 
            instill in students a lasting flow of remembered time, when the 
            regular conditions of contemporary life militate against effective 
            remembering? It would be another circumstance were the student exposed to two, 
            three, or four information flows, and, thus, entrance into the 
            Biblical stream, if you will, would have a chance of being a more 
            vivid experience. Instead, the confluence of numerous streams floods 
            the student’s mind and washes out the banks or sides that support 
            the historical sense. Computers, televisions, radios, telephones, 
            tape recorders, all of these gadgets allow him or her to obtain 
            information whenever he feels like it, creating an increasing 
            inattentiveness towards his experiences. If the teacher is not 
            vitally aware of these conditions, he or she will be trapped within 
            this same nonchalance and merely be contributing to the continued 
            erosion of the historical sense. Before condemning the conditions of everyday life, we must 
            acknowledge that the greatest inhibitor of the development of the 
            historical sense has been History itself, that is, the sheer volume 
            of historical knowledge. I repeat: “has been.” Friedrich Nietzsche, 
            one hundred and thirty years ago, diagnosed this malady of History 
            in the second volume of his “Thoughts Out of Season,” 
            THE USE AND ABUSE OF HISTORY. He focused on the excess of 
            History and how this excess “attacked the plastic power of life” by 
            crowding out the unhistorical. The unhistorical he defined as man 
            “going into the present” and having the power of forgetfulness. 
            Educators and historians in 19th 
            century Germany were oblivious of the fact that history served an 
            unhistorical power; the excess of history no longer allowed man to 
            act unhistorically and spontaneously. In today’s classroom, the 
            unhistorical is still neglected. Today, History is taught as another 
            information stream, a formal competitor against video docudramas and 
            mythologies for the student’s immediate attention, with History 
            disappearing into an undifferentiated confluence. Nietzsche likens 
            the unhistorical to “the surrounding atmosphere that can alone 
            create life in whose annihilation life itself disappears.” The unhistorical is an elusive component for the history teacher, 
            who, upon comprehending its importance, might have trouble 
            describing it in action. It is difficult to pin down the 
            unhistorical, in the classroom or even in this essay, as if its very 
            appearance dispels its importance and potency. At best, we might 
            suggest its presence and hope for some result. The History teacher 
            must do more than teach History and supply the unhistorical 
            ingredient. How can a student leave the classroom with a sense of 
            the unhistorical? A few years ago, I attended a lecture entitled 
            “Poetry and Magic,” and one of the audience members remarked that in 
            some cultures the “spell” incanted for a given occasion cannot be 
            taught — it must be overheard — and one must acquire it by stealth 
            or theft. The teacher puts the student in a position to overhear the 
            “spell.” Not every teacher is an historian, and it would be a great burden 
            to require History instruction to supply a meaningful historical 
            dimension. Yet, this precisely must be done. The History teacher 
            must do more that teach History. How the teacher might restore this 
            lost ingredient to the History program is one of the great lessons 
            suggested by the books and lectures of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, 
            especially from his history, OUT OF REVOLUTION: 
            AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WESTERN MAN.   
             The teaching crisis is merely a tributary of the historical 
            crisis which runs through the last hundred years. History teaching 
            feels acutely the effects of this crisis because of the symbiotic 
            relationship between History and Education. When Rosenstock-Huessy 
            discusses education in his essay “Teaching Too Late, Learning Too 
            Early,” he writes primarily about teaching History: 
                We teachers are the cultural lag of mankind. Less politely, 
                we are the hyenas of its battlefields, for we disembowel the 
                heroes of antiquity if we are left to our natural tendencies as 
                teachers. We must occasionally avoid these tendencies if we want to develop 
            the student’s historical sense, a sense he defines thus: “Every 
            human being, for his own salvation, must be trained in the timing 
            of his own experiences” (italics added). In a paper read before 
            the American Historical Association in 1934 
            entitled “The Predicament of History,” Rosenstock-Huessy makes a 
            similar point: 
                Modern Man seems no longer to register experience without 
                special training. Without the capacity for keeping and 
                developing the process of selection which we call tradition, the 
                group can have no history. The power of selection which applied 
                by Darwin to processes in the world of animals and plants is in 
                reality the power of civilization. And this power can be wasted 
                or lost. History. Education. Special training. History. Education. A 
            recirculation process. They feed one another to fortify the process. The aforementioned crisis represents a fouling of the waters, and 
            History and Education today merely recirculate the poisons. An 
            antidote to this poisonous flow at once seems impossible to find or 
            not worth finding because nobody knows how to administer it. What do 
            we do? Imagine a crisis generally as the last and most terrible swelling 
            of a social or political problem. Following the lead of the Spanish 
            philosopher José Ortega y Gasset, we can consider “crisis” an 
            historical concept. In MAN AND CRISIS, Ortega 
            rigorously defines historical crisis first and foremost as a 
            predicament of History, a peculiar historical change. He describes 
            this change when 
                the system of convictions belonging to a previous generation 
                gives way to a vital state in which man remains without these 
                convictions. Man returns to a state of not knowing what to do, 
                for the reason that he returns to a state of actually not 
                knowing what to think about the world. Rosenstock-Huessy defines crisis in nearly the same terms in
            THE ORIGIN OF SPEECH, when he 
            describes the four “diseases” of Speech: war, crisis, revolution, 
            and degeneration. “The inner crisis of a disintegrating society is 
            constituted by the fact that too many people inside this society are 
            not told what to do.” No one can be told what to do because no one 
            knows what to think about the world. He adds: “In crisis we wait for 
            anybody to tell us.” In this book Ortega deals primarily with the Renaissance, but he 
            points to earlier periods, both times in ancient Rome: during the 
            first century before and the third century after Christ, which 
            suffered similar social and cultural upheavals. In pre-Christian 
            Rome, in a reference to Cicero, a familiar problem: “From a world 
            which has turned itself back into pure problem — and man is part of 
            that world — one cannot hope for anything positive; the substance of 
            life is desperation.” He quotes Cicero’s DE FINIBUS
            BONORUM ET MALORUM: “‘We academicians’ — that 
            is to say, he, Cicero, declares himself an academician — ’are in a 
            desperate state from too much knowing” (italics 
            added). In other words, understanding that a crisis exists does not 
            necessarily guarantee an escape from it. The will to knowledge is 
            not enough. “Our Soul,” writes Rosenstock-Huessy, “overloaded with 
            so much past, replies by a nervous breakdown.” The epigraphs which open this essay bespeak the seriousness and 
            depth of the crisis and add an imperative to the search for some 
            relief from our historical predicament. Doris Lessing’s passages 
            dwell on public indifference born from numbness to hearing about 
            mass murders and genocide. Reports of twenty to eighty million 
            killed weirdly echo a fast food chain’s promotional claims: 
            billions and billions sold. Rosenstock-Huessy had written that 
            “objectivity without gratitude for the relation of our thought to 
            other people’s lifeblood is intolerable.” History is transformed 
            into a sideshow for trivia freaks. The facts and numbers lose 
            reality in proportion to the frequency with which they are pressed 
            upon us. The truth needs a rest occasionally, or it will not have 
            the strength to penetrate our minds. At some point during the slide into barbarism, our humanity is 
            degraded and lost. The descent does not make good headlines nor is 
            it distinguishable one day, one month, or one year to the next. 
            There are only indications that things are wrong. Concentration 
            camps and death chambers; tribal genocide; the gulags; death squads. 
            When these kinds of events have occurred, inside or outside western 
            nations, our response has been disingenuous. How could such savagery 
            happen in a world of air-conditioned buildings, organized sports, 
            and the general wish for all to live in peace? Only madmen would 
            think of starting wars — you know the usual suspects: Kim Il Sung, 
            Saddam Hussein, Milosevic, Khadaffi — and threaten to deny us our 
            luxuries. Analogously, our personal sense of security is shattered 
            each time we read about the latest serial killer or an otherwise 
            friendly neighbor who has shot the wife and kids and himself. Unthinkable things, once suppressed by a common if fragile 
            humanity. We have forgotten that being born human is the most 
            fragile state of life. Moderated by a sensitive historical 
            brotherhood. Unthinkable things, now commonplace and nearly 
            tolerable. Ortega’s broad comments about historically ignorant man 
            anticipate Lessing’s response to the statistical nightmare. Her 
            question: “Is it possible that our careless, our casual, use of 
            these ‘millions’ is one of the reasons for the brutality, the 
            cruelty,” realizes a discernible way we can avoid the historical 
            crisis. We cannot prove the connection between our attitudes and the 
            brutalities; her analysis resembles the associative connections a 
            reader makes within a short story, play, or novel and corresponds to 
            a process Ortega labels “historical reason,” which will be our 
            response to History’s breakdown.   
             “Do not believe any history that does not spring from the mind of 
            a rare spirit,” Nietzsche writes in THE USE AND ABUSE 
            OF HISTORY. Such a rare spirit we recognize in 
            Rosenstock-Huessy’s OUT OF REVOLUTION. Despite 
            its recognition as a great historical work, the book invites the 
            kind of misunderstanding offered by Crane Brinton: “Written in what 
            to an American seems the cloud-cuckoo-land of beautiful and inexact 
            ideas, choosing convenient and rejecting inconvenient facts, 
            something in the tradition of Spengler, but with the kindly hopes of 
            a man of good will.”  When Nietzsche saw the excesses of History causing a malady of 
            History, he proposed an antidote: the unhistorical by which he meant 
            “the power, the art, of forgetting and drawing a limited horizon 
            around oneself.” This anticipated Crane Brinton’s feeble objections 
            to OUT OF REVOLUTION. To the contrary 
            Rosenstock-Huessy increased the dose for curing the twentieth 
            century’s historical malady. Unfortunately, the uniqueness of
            OUT OF REVOLUTION “left it high and dry on the 
            sands of academe.” Page Smith adds in his assessment of the book 
            that “[n]obody knew what to make of it because no one had seen 
            nothing like it.” The book, “demanded to be accepted or rejected.” 
            In the end, it was ignored. Again, Nietzsche best described how a 
            work like OUT OF REVOLUTION should be 
            construed: “The Delphian god cries his oracle to you at the 
            beginning of your wanderings: ‘Know thyself.’ It is a hard saying, 
            for that god ‘tells nothing and conceals nothing but merely points 
            the way,’ as Heraclitus said. But whither does he point?” Where does Rosenstock-Huessy point? OUT OF 
            REVOLUTION’ s subtitle is one direction. It proposes the book 
            to be an autobiography: but that of Western Man’s, and thus “no one 
            man’s enterprise.” Referring to our own autobiographical 
            circumstance, Rosenstock-Huessy invites our collaboration: “In 
            adding from his own memory, whatever he knows of French, English, 
            Russian, or Italian history [the reader] cannot but enlarge and 
            round out our draft.” He points toward our own past, whence we may 
            organize the chaos in ourselves in thinking our way back to our true 
            needs. OUT OF REVOLUTIONalso points to the unhistorical in the 
            form of an aesthetic principle: the invisible ingredient used by 
            Rosenstock-Huessy to bind an account of 27
            generations from Gregory the Great to V.I. 
            Lenin. Brinton had fretted over the author’s selection of facts, but 
            by just looking at the book’s table of contents, he might have seen 
            that more than convenient choices were made. The first thing you see 
            is that the events will be cast in a backward chronological order, 
            starting with the Russian Revolution. This represents a bit of 
            startling inspiration, especially when one compares it to Rosenstock- 
            Huessy’s THE EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONS, in which he 
            used a straightforward chronology, published only eight years before
            OUT OF REVOLUTION. Why he changed his approach 
            is unclear, but the significance of the change is unmistakable. 
            Rosenstock- Huessy writes: 
                We are recording vive voce the autobiography of Europe 
                during the last thousand years with regard to its connection 
                backwards; we are convinced, however, that any history of the 
                evolution of mankind will prove a failure if it tries to deprive 
                us of the greatest contribution of the last twenty years. I mean 
                any history of mankind which fails to start frankly and modestly 
                from the experiences and sufferings of our generation. Bruce Boston, one of the book’s principal interpreters, connects 
            the autobiographical element to the “backward” structure: “Rather 
            than viewing the great upheavals of western history as shameful 
            interruptions in the course of its orderly flow, [he] is prepared to 
            present them as exhibiting the same inner cohesion one would expect 
            to find in the life of a single individual.” The aesthetic pull from OUT OF REVOLUTION’s 
            structure emanates from this inner cohesion. The choice of working 
            backward from the Russian Revolution, to invert the regular order 
            from which we normally discern cohesion (for instance, in a history 
            course in high school or college), is as profound and meaningful as 
            the choice by the Church Fathers to order the gospels Matthew, Mark, 
            Luke, and John. In Rosenstock-Huessy’s THE FRUIT OF 
            LIPS, OR WHY FOUR GOSPELS, he points out that  
                [t]he sequence of the four gospels is necessary because this 
                sequence reverses the order which begins with the natural 
                individuality of Jesus. And such a reverse of nature is the 
                necessary sequence in human articulation! The gospels, he is saying, work under an aesthetic principle to 
            articulate a unity among them which can admit no other gospel. 
            Likewise, the unhistorical as an aesthetic principle should 
            articulate History that can admit no other information flow! 
                They begat each other. Every gospel begins exactly at the 
                point to which the previous gospel has progressed on its 
                tortuous path. The last word of the one is the overture and sets 
                the tone for the next! If Rosenstock-Huessy’s scheme for the Gospels seems farfetched, 
            examine Richard Elliott Friedman’s book, THE 
            DISAPPEARANCE OF GOD, in which he shows how the order in 
            which the Old Testament was written doesn’t conform to the order we 
            get in the Bible; yet, Friedman describes a cohesion of which 
            suggests a nearly artistic or aesthetic subtlety.1 The aesthetic quality and attraction of Rosenstock-Huessy’s 
            OUT OF REVOLUTION is never more obvious than after viewing 
            Harold Pinter’s play BETRAYAL. The backward 
            development of the drama2  raises the 
            story of a conventional love triangle to a level where we can come 
            to terms with the vital human or individual elements of the drama. 
            In the case of this play, the begged question is, “Why does the 
            affair fail?” The backward device particularizes what was an 
            invisible dimension in the adulterous relationship, Time, and 
            articulates Time’s failure and constant betrayal of Man by changing 
            him. Pinter’s characters are squashed by Time, but they never 
            comprehend the slow disintegration of their relationships and the 
            draining of their emotions. The intimacy dissolves as if it would 
            inevitably lead to this point — except that Pinter started 
            with the dissolution. Moreover, all the relationships seem tainted 
            by betrayal.  The characters had believed their feelings to be everlasting, 
            imperishable. Then Jerry falls in love with his best friend’s wife 
            and speaks of satisfying his desires instantly in the present, as if 
            he could defeat time’s betrayal. He has just cornered Emma in a 
            bedroom. The speech occurs at play’s end. 
                . Look at the way you’re looking at me. I can’t wait 
                for you, I’m bowled over, I’m totally knocked out, you dazzle 
                me, you jewel, my jewel, I can’t ever sleep again, no, listen, 
                it’s the truth, I won’t walk, I’ll be a cripple, I’ll descend, 
                I’ll diminish, into total paralysis, my life is in your hands, 
                that’s what you’re banishing me to, a state of catatonia, do you 
                know the state of catatonia? do you? the state of. . .where the 
                reigning prince is the prince of emptiness, the prince of 
                absence, the prince of desolation. I love you.Jerry This passage actually describes Jerry at the play’s beginning 
            when he meets Emma for the first time since the breakup of his 
            marriage. He’s desolate, empty, lost. While all the characters feel 
            betrayed or seem to have been betrayed, Jerry suffers the deepest 
            funk because he has failed the most to adapt to the change of 
            feeling.  In OUT OF REVOLUTION, the backward 
            development not only acknowledges the primacy of Time but witnesses 
            the continuity of the generations. Time is an element of salvation, 
            not damnation. One can admire Rosenstock-Huessy’s faith at the time 
            of the writing, 1938, when Stalinism and 
            Fascism were squashing Europe. The historical and political squeeze 
            soon deprived the European his autonomy, his life becoming less and 
            less his own and more the state’s, as Ortega wrote. Analogously, 
            Pinter’s characters suffer fates characteristic of the eternal love 
            triangle: their lives become less and less their own because they 
            are unable to circulate the “time poison” out of their 
            relationships. Rosenstock-Huessy recognized the crisis and refused to turn away. 
            He actively engaged his world as a swimmer would the wall of a pool, 
            propelling himself from it forward into the past toward something 
            beyond the daily eternities.   
             In applying the lessons from Rosenstock-Huessy’s book to the 
            teaching of history or education generally, we should not 
            necessarily look to the school or classroom to work “magic.” That 
            is, we shouldn’t expect an administrative directive or national 
            standards to guide teachers. It would be too much to expect the 
            powers that be to understand that the accumulation of facts is not 
            enough. Nor should students look forward to a time when detailed 
            factual knowledge is expendable. How can we make anyone understand 
            the wisdom that “we must allow our young people a deliberate amount 
            of ignorance lest their genius be stifled,” he wrote in
            THE FRUIT OF LIPS. Could we as a society extend this wisdom and curb the infinite 
            excitements of our everyday life? Could we not deliberately limit 
            ourselves to a modest range of resources? Limit the information 
            flows? How can we protect students who are being drowned in a flood 
            of meaningless facts, when we are unaware that the very forms that 
            protect them from historical illiteracy have eroded? Will this alarm 
            merely become lost amid all the other calls for the “improvement” of 
            our educational institutions? The imprecision of the concept “unhistorical” compels me link it 
            to something experienced but indefinable. Rosenstock-Huessy’s 
            historical work, like OUT OF REVOLUTION, 
            teaches us how to sneak the unhistorical into the classroom: in the 
            form of an aesthetic principle. By this I mean that history teachers 
            will consciously lessen their information flow and more sharply 
            design their lessons. Sooner or later, an effective application of 
            their teaching may lodge itself in students’ minds, and the students 
            in turn will sneak the unhistorical back into society. Perhaps they 
            will turn off their televisions for a few years and pay attention 
            more closely to their own sense of the shape of things. Eventually, 
            the information flow will slowly adjust itself to levels students 
            can handle. 
 Notes: 1 He makes the greater claim in THE HIDDEN 
            BOOK IN THE BIBLE that one writer was 
            responsible for a large part of the Old Testament. 2 Scenes 1 & 2 — Spring 1977; 3 — Winter 1975; 4 — Autumn 1974; 
            5, 6, & 7: Summer 1973; 8 — Summer 1971; 9 — Winter 1968. Bibliography: Boston, Bruce. “I RESPOND ALTHOUGH I 
                WILL BE CHANGED”: The Life and Historical 
                Thought of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy. Ph.D. dissertation, 
                Princeton University, 1973 Brinton, Crane. THE ANATOMY OF 
                REVOLUTION. New York: Vintage, 1965  Hirsch, E.D. CULTURAL LITERACY. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1987 Lessing, Doris. THE WIND BLOWS AWAY OUR 
                WORDS. New York: Vintage, 1987 Nietzsche, Friedrich. THE USE AND ABUSE 
                OF HISTORY. Trans. by Adrian Collins. 
                Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957 Ortega y Gasset, José. MAN AND CRISIS. 
                Trans. by Mildred Adams. New York: Norton, 1962 Pinter, Harold. BETRAYAL. 
                New York: Grove Press, 1978 Rosenstock-Huessy, Eugen. I AM AN 
                IMPURE THINKER. Norwich, Vt.: Argo Books, 
                1970  _________. THE FRUIT OF LIPS, OR WHY 
                FOUR GOSPELS. Pittsburgh, PA: The 
                Pickwick Press, 1978 _________. THE MULTIFORMITY OF MAN, 
                Norwich, Vt.: Argo Books, 1973 _________. THE ORIGIN OF SPEECH, 
                Norwich, Vt.: Argo Books, 1981 _________. OUT OF REVOLUTION: 
                AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WESTERN MAN. Norwich, 
                Vt.: Argo Books, 1969 _________.“The Predicament of History,” The Journal of 
                Philosophy, September 1935 Smith, Page. HISTORY AND THE HISTORIAN. 
                New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964 |